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Maclean's Spying More Vital Than British Have Admitted

London Sunday Times

LONDON, Oct. 7—A secret intelligence report which the Sunday Times tracked down in Washington in the course of its investigations into the Philby conspiracy makes it clear that, contrary to repeated British government assertions since 1951, Donald Maclean had access to every crucial Anglo-American policy decision at the height of the Cold War.

The report was compiled in 1956 by U.S. State Department intelligence officers in an attempt to assess the damage done by Maclean and Guy D. Burgess who fled with him in 1951. For the first time, the report reveals the magnitude of Maclean's espionage achievements.


It is also the first evidence from official files that the British government has been consistently misleading in its statements on Maclean's duties and the type of material to which he had access.

In fact, the U.S. intelligence report reveals that Maclean had knowledge of secret Anglo-American exchanges on the North Atlantic pact, the Korean War and the Japanese peace treaty."

It also shows, for instance, that Maclean had full knowledge of the critical American determination to "localize the conflict," and therefore of its decision not to allow the United Nations forces under Gen. MacArthur to carry the war against the Chinese coast.

Both MacArthur and his chief of intelligence, Gen. Charles Willoughby, were certain at the time that this information had been passed







GUY BURGESS

... took their secrets to Moscow in 1951

to the Russians. Just before he died, MacArthur complained that the Chinese not only knew of this policy decision but "all our strategic troop movements."

Until now it has generally been believed that Maclean, first secretary in the British Embassy in Washington and later head of the American Department in the Foreign Office, passed to the Russians only marginal atomic secrets. He saw these in the course of his duties as U.K. secretary of the combined policy committee—the body set up to regulate the Anglo-American exchange of scientific information on the atomic program.

This information was vital enough, the report reveals. Maclean was able to tell the Russians "the estimates made at that time of uranium ore supply available to the three governments—Britain, America, and Canada.

To appreciate the signifi-

cance of this the circumstances of 1947 have to be recalled. In the early postwar years the world supply of uranjum was thought to be limited. The West therefore embarked, in extreme secrecy upon a program of "premptive buying" of uranjum, in an attempt to corner all the known resources. Maclean was in a position to tell the Russians every detail of these vital negotiations.

The revelations provide the first credible explanation of the necessity that drove the master-spy Harold Philby to risking, and in the event wrecking, his whole espionage career, to tip off Maclean before the British security services could reach him,

Maclean was not, as previous explanations have suggested, simply an old friend. He was Russia's most important known diplomatic spy in the cold war years.